This paper examines the relation between outside investor protection and earnings management. We argue that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. We hypothesize that earnings management decreases in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits and hence reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Using accounting data from 31 countries between 1990 and 1999, we present empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Our result points to an important link between legal institutions, private control benefits and the quality of accounting earnings reported to capital market participants. These findings complement prior finance research that generally treats the quality of corporate reporting as exogenous. 
Introduction
The legal protection of outside investors has been identified as a key determinant of financial market development, capital and ownership structures, dividend policies, and private control benefits around the world (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 and La Porta et al, 2000a) .
Extant work, however, has paid scant attention to the relation between legal protection and the quality of financial information reported by insiders, namely managers and controlling shareholders, to outsiders, namely the firm's minority (or arm's length) shareholders and creditors. 1 Reporting firm performance in a "true and fair" manner is critical for effective corporate governance because it allows outsiders to monitor their claims and exercise their rights (see, for example, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 1999) .
In this paper, we highlight legal protection as a key primitive affecting the quality of firms' earnings. Strong and well-enforced outsider rights limit the acquisition of private control benefits, and consequently, mitigate insiders' incentives to manage accounting earnings, as insiders have little to conceal from outsiders. This insight motivates our primary hypothesis that the pervasiveness of earnings management is decreasing in legal protection. Our empirical findings are consistent with this hypothesis.
Following Healy and Wahlen (1999), we define earnings management as the alteration of firms' reported economic performance by insiders to either "mislead some stakeholders" or to "influence contractual outcomes." We argue that incentives to misrepresent firm performance through earnings management arise from a conflict of interest between the firms' insiders and 1 While previous work acknowledges the importance of accounting information, it generally treats the quality of this information as exogenous (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998) . Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between stated accounting rules and firms' actual reporting practices. Even though accounting standards likely affect the quality of reported earnings, they can and often are circumvented by insiders (see also Ball et al., 1999). outsiders. 2 Specifically, insiders use their control over the firm's resources to benefit themselves at the expense of outsiders. If these private control benefits are detected, outsiders are likely to take disciplinary actions against insiders. Consequently, insiders have an incentive to conceal these resource diversions from outsiders. 3 We argue that insiders manipulate accounting reports of firm performance in an attempt to hide their private control benefits. For instance, insiders can use their discretion in financial reporting to overstate earnings and conceal unfavorable earnings realizations (e.g., losses) that would prompt outsider interference. Similarly, insiders can use accounting choices to understate earnings in years of good performance to create reserves for periods of poor future performance, effectively making reported earnings less variable than true firm performance. Outsiders' ability to govern a firm is weakened when extensive earnings management results in financial reports that inaccurately reflect firm performance.
The effectiveness of a country's legal system in protecting minority shareholders and outside creditors limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000a; Nenova, 2000; Dyck and Zingales, 2002) . Strong legal protection increases insiders' costs of diverting resources (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000a; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2000) . We argue that insiders' incentive to conceal their private control benefits decreases in the legal system's effectiveness in protecting outside investor interests. Thus, our primary hypothesis is that earnings management decreases in legal protection because strong investor protection limits the acquisition of private control benefits, which reduces insiders' incentives to obfuscate performance.
This hypothesis is tested using financial accounting and institutional data for a sample of firms from 31 countries (from 1990 to 1999) with substantial variation in investor protection laws and enforcement activities. We create four related proxies to measure the pervasiveness of earnings management in a country. The measures capture the extent to which insiders manage the "accounting" component of reported earnings to smooth or mask the firm's economic performance, and together proxy for the level of earnings management in a country.
Our analysis begins with a descriptive country cluster analysis, which groups countries with similar legal and institutional characteristics. Three distinct country clusters are identified:
(1) outsider economies with strong legal enforcement (e.g., UK and US); (2) insider economies with strong legal enforcement (e.g. Germany and Japan); and, (3) insider economies with weak legal enforcement (e.g., Italy and India). The clusters closely parallel simple code/common-law and regional characterizations used in prior work (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; Ball et al. 2000) .
Outsider economies with strong enforcement display the lowest and insider economies with weak enforcement the highest level of earnings management. That is, earnings management appears to be lower in economies with strong investor protection, large stock markets, dispersed ownership, and strong legal enforcement.
To relate earnings management more explicitly to the level of investor protection, we undertake a multiple regression analysis. Outside investor protection is measured by the extent of minority shareholder rights as well as the quality of legal enforcement. Our results show that earnings management is negatively related to outsider rights and legal enforcement. These results are robust after controlling for differences in economic development, macroeconomic stability, industry composition and firm characteristics across countries. Tests that account for the endogeneity of investor protection and other institutional factors, such as differences in the accounting rules or ownership concentration, provide further evidence that investor protection is a key determinant of earnings management activity across countries. We also provide direct evidence that earnings management is positively associated with the level of private control benefits enjoyed by insiders.
This study builds on recent advances in the corporate governance literature on the role of legal protection in financial market development, ownership structures, and private control benefits (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000a) . We extend this literature by presenting evidence that the level of outside investor protection endogenously determines the quality of financial information reported to outsiders. These results add to our understanding of how legal protection influences the agency conflict between outsider investors and controlling insiders. Weak legal protection appears to result in poor-quality financial reporting, which is likely to undermine the development of arm's length financial markets.
Our work also contributes to a growing literature on international differences in firms' financial reporting. Prior research has analyzed the relation between earnings and stock prices around the world, only implicitly accounting for international differences in institutional factors (e.g., Alford et al., 1993; Joos and Lang, 1994; Land and Lang, 2000) . Our results suggest that a country's legal and institutional environment fundamentally influences the properties of reported earnings. In this regard, our study complements the recent work by Ball et al. (1999 and , Fan and Wong (1999) , Ali and Hwang (2000) , and Hung (2001), which documents that various institutional factors explain differences in the price-earnings association across countries. 4 However, the price-earnings association reflects both differences in the pricing mechanism and earnings management. Thus, it is important to understand the effect of institutional factors on reported earnings when examining the relation between stock prices and "managed" earnings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Specific hypotheses are developed in section 2. Section 3 describes the construction of the earnings management measures. In section 4, we describe the sample and provide descriptive statistics. Empirical tests and results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Earnings management, private control benefits and investor protection
In this section, we argue that international differences in incentives to misrepresent firm performance arise from a conflict of interest between the firms' insiders and outsiders, i.e., the incentive of insiders to acquire private control benefits, effectively expropriating outsiders.
Recent advances in the corporate governance literature suggest that this agency conflict is widespread around the world and affected by a country's legal structure (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999 and 2000a; Claessens et al., 2000b) .
Private control benefits and hiding incentives
A benefit of acquiring control in a firm is that controlling parties, such as majority owners or managers, need not share gains with all the firms' owners. Examples of private control benefits are wide-ranging. They include the "psychic" value of being in charge and fairly facile forms of profit diversion such as perquisite consumption. At the other end of the spectrum, private control benefits include outright theft or transfer of firm assets to other firms 6 owned by insiders and their family members. The common theme is that some value is enjoyed exclusively by insiders and not shared with non-controlling outsiders.
As a consequence, controlling insiders have incentives to conceal their private control benefits from non-controlling parties, i.e. outside investors (see also Zingales, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . If these private control benefits are detected, outsiders are likely to take disciplinary actions against insiders. We therefore argue that managers and controlling owners have an incentive to manage earnings in order to conceal the firm's true performance from outsiders. 
The role of investor protection
In order to limit insiders' private control benefits, outside investors design contracts that confer them rights to discipline insiders (e.g., to replace managers). 7 However, outsiders must rely on their country's legal system to enforce these contracts (La Porta, et. al., 1998) . Legal factors. 5 Note that we do not claim that managers always use their discretion to reduce the informativeness of financial reports. In fact, the evidence in US suggests that on average managers use their discretion in a way that increases the informativeness of earnings (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . These findings, however, may be the result of an effective outside investor protection and therefore may not extent to countries with weak investor protection. 6 There is no end to the stories where insiders attempt to conceal poor performance and expropriation through financial statement manipulation. et al. (2000b) show that higher dividend payouts are associated with stronger minority shareholder protection. Claessens et al. (2000a ), Nenova (2000 , and Dyck and Zingales (2002) find that private control benefits are negatively associated with stronger outsider protection and legal enforcement.
As effective outside investor protection limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits, it also reduces insiders' need to conceal their activities. We hypothesize that earnings management is more pervasive in countries with weak legal protection of outside investors because insiders enjoy greater private control benefits and hence have stronger incentives to obfuscate firm performance. Following La Porta et al. (1998) , we distinguish between the legal rights accorded to outside investors and the quality of their enforcement. The strength of laws that protect minority rights and their enforcement via the judicial system are complementary legal structures and hence are both hypothesized to be negatively associated with earnings management.
Competing effects
In the preceding discussion, we argue that outside investor protection is a key primitive that affects insiders' earnings management activities across countries. A number of other factors 7 Outsiders are also expected to price protect themselves, leading to more internal financing, smaller arm's length financial markets and higher cost of outside capital. See La Porta et al. (1997) and Bhattacharya et al. (2002) .
are purported to affect earnings quality at the country level. These factors can be broadly categorized as essentially exogenous factors, such as industry composition, and arguably endogenous factors, such as accounting standards and ownership structure. We attempt to explicitly control for exogenous factors, such as industry composition and macroeconomic stability, in our empirical analyses.
While accounting standards and ownership structure are important factors correlated with observed earnings management activities, it is unclear whether they are fundamental primitives.
In our view, low earnings management, well-functioning markets for outside capital and dispersed ownership patterns are joint outcomes of strong investor protection. Prior work shows that investor protection is the key primitive that explains corporate choices, such as firms'
financing and dividend policies as well as ownership structures (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997 Porta et al. , 1999 Porta et al. , 2000a . Accounting rules likely reflect the influence of a country's legal and institutional framework and are therefore endogenous in our analysis. 8 Countries with strong outsider legal protection are expected to enact and enforce accounting and securities laws that limit the manipulation of accounting information reported to outsiders. Consistent with this view, Enriques (2000) argues that UK and the US laws on director self-dealing are stricter and are more reliant on disclosure than those in Germany or Italy. Similarly, d ' Arcy (2000) shows that
Anglo-American countries have stricter accounting rules with respect to accounting choices than do Continental-European countries with less effective investor protection. Moreover, the extent to which accounting rules limit insiders' ability to engage in earnings management depends on how well these rules are enforced. 
Earnings management measures
This section develops the earnings management measures that are used to examine the relation between investor protection and the quality of accounting information reported to outside investors. Much of the measure construction relies on the existing earnings management literature (see Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000) . We analyze four different measures of earnings management because insiders can exercise their discretion along a number of different dimensions and the discretion afforded them varies across countries. The earnings management measures reflect both the level and variability of reported earnings. Our approach captures the outcomes of earnings management activities and sidesteps the problem that countries' stated accounting rules often lack enforcement and hence do not reflect insiders' actual reporting practices (see also Ball et al., 1999) .
Smoothing reported operating earnings using accruals
Insiders can hide changes in the firm's economic performance using both real operating decisions and financial reporting choices. To focus on insiders' reporting choices, the first smoothing measure captures the degree to which insiders alter the "accounting" component of 
where ∆CA it = change in total current assets, ∆Cash it = change in cash/cash equivalents,
∆CL it = change in total current liabilities, ∆STD it = change in short-term debt included in current liabilities, ∆TP it = change in income taxes payable, Dep it = depreciation and amortization expense. Changes in short-term debt are excluded from accruals because they relate to financing transactions as opposed to operating activities. If a firm does not report information on taxes payable or short-term debt, then the change in both variables is assumed to be zero.
Smoothing and the correlation of accounting accruals and operating cash flows
Insiders wishing to conceal firm performance can use accounting discretion to offset economic shocks to the firm's operating cash flow. They can undo negative shocks to hide poor performance or offset positive shocks to create "hidden reserves" for the future. In both cases, the use of accounting accruals to buffer cash flow shocks results in a negative correlation between changes in accruals and operating cash flows (see Skinner and Myers, 1999) . While a negative correlation is also a "natural" result of accrual accounting, the magnitude of this negative correlation, ceteris paribus, indicates opportunistic smoothing of reported earnings that does not reflect a firm's underlying economic performance. 10 Therefore, the contemporaneous correlation between the change in accounting accruals and the change in operating cash flows is the second measure of earnings smoothing. The correlation is computed over the pooled set of firms in each country and the accrual and operating cash flow components of earnings are computed as in equation (1).
Discretion in reported earnings: The magnitude of accruals
Apart from dampening fluctuations in firm performance, insiders can use their reporting discretion to simply misstate the firm's economic performance. For instance, insiders can overstate reported earnings to achieve certain earnings targets or report an extraordinary performance in specific instances, such as an equity issuance (see, e.g., Dechow and Skinner, 2000) . The third measure uses the magnitude of accruals as a proxy for the amount of discretion exercised by insiders. It is computed as the country's median ratio of the absolute value of 10 Under the reasonable assumption that accounting systems on average underreact to economic shocks, insiders wishing to reveal the firm's economic performance are likely to use accruals in a way that results in a less negative (or in some cases even positive) correlation.
accruals scaled by the absolute value of the firm's cash flow from operations. Scaling controls for differences in firm performance (and size). Degeorge et al. (1999) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) present evidence that US managers use accounting discretion to avoid reporting small losses. While one may argue that managers have an incentive to avoid losses of any size, they have limited reporting discretion and hence are unable to report profits in the presence of large losses. Small losses, however, are more likely to lie within the bounds of insiders' reporting discretion and can be avoided at relatively low cost. Thus, in each country, the ratio of small reported profits to small reported losses reflects the extent to which firm insiders exercise discretion to avoid reporting losses.
Discretion in reported earnings: Small loss avoidance
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) , the ratio of "small" profits to "small" losses is computed, for each country, using after-tax earnings scaled by total assets. Small losses are defined to be in the range [-0.01, 0.00) and small profits are defined to be in the range [0.00, 0.01]. In order to reliably compute this ratio, we require at least 5 observations of small losses for a country to be included in the sample. 
Aggregate measure of earnings management
Finally, to mitigate potential measurement error, we construct an overall summary measure of earnings management for each country. For each of the four earnings management measures, countries are ranked such that a higher score suggests a higher level of earnings management. An aggregate earnings management measure is computed by averaging the ranks of the four individual earnings management measures.
11 Three countries (Chile, New Zealand, Turkey) do not meet this criterion and hence are dropped.
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
Our data are obtained from the Worldscope database, which contains up to ten years of historical financial data from home-country annual reports of publicly traded companies around the world. Banks and financial institutions are excluded from the empirical analysis. To be included in the sample, a country must have at least 300 firm-year observations for a number of accounting variables, including total assets, sales, net income, and operating income. Each firm must have income statement and balance sheet information for at least 3 consecutive years.
Finally, three countries with hyperinflation over the sample period are excluded because high inflation may unduly affect the earnings management measures. 12 The final sample consists of 70,955 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 1990-99 across 31 countries and 8,616 nonfinancial firms.
Panel A of Table 1 presents the number of firm-year observations per country as well as descriptive statistics of firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables for each country.
There is significant variation in the number of firm-year observations across countries due to differences in capital market development, country size, and the availability of complete financial accounting data. 13 To allow for direct firm-size comparisons across countries, the country median of firms' sales in $US is reported. Based on the large differences in the median firm size across countries, we scale all financial variables by the lagged value of total assets. 14 There is also substantial cross-country variation in capital intensity, the fraction of manufacturing firms, per-capita GDP, inflation and volatility of growth. We address the 12 We eliminate Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The inflation rates for these countries were considerably higher than any other country in the sample, which is likely to increase the volatility of their accounting numbers and hence lead to low rankings for the smoothness measures. The results, however, are qualitatively unchanged if these countries remain in the sample. 13 Note that the Worldscope database currently includes only US firms that belong to the S&P 500. 14 Scaling by lagged sales instead does not affect the results. potential confounding effects of cross-country differences in these variables in the multiple regressions.
Panel B of Table 1 provides summary information on the key legal protection and institutional variables for each country in the sample. All institutional variables are drawn from data used by La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) . The legal origin and legal tradition assignments are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Panel B. The proxy for outside investor rights is an "antidirector rights" index that captures the aggregate rights of minority shareholders. Belgium, Germany and Italy rate low on this index while Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have a high rating. The legal enforcement measure for each country is the mean score across three variables, each ranging from zero to ten: (1) an index of the legal system's efficiency, (2) an index of the rule of law, and (3) the level of corruption. Scandinavian countries have the highest level of enforcement while countries like Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines have the lowest. The "importance of equity markets" is measured by the mean rank across (1) the ratio of the aggregate stock market held by minorities to gross national product, (2) the number of listed domestic stocks relative to the population, and (3) the number of IPOs relative to the population. Ownership concentration is measured as the median percentage of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders, in the ten largest privately owned nonfinancial firms. Finally, the disclosure index measures the inclusion or omission of 90 accounting items in firms' 1990 annual reports and hence captures firms' disclosure policies.
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the four individual earnings management measures as well as the aggregate earnings management score. The countries are sorted in descending order based on the calculated aggregate earnings management measure.
The first smoothing measure (EM1) shows that operating income is less variable than operating cash flows in all countries. The second smoothing measure (EM2) indicates that changes in accounting accruals and operating cash flows are significantly negatively correlated in all countries. Given the nature of the accrual accounting process, and the fact that all countries use accrual accounting, these findings are not surprising. However, there appears to be a systematic pattern in the relative magnitude of these measures across countries. For example, the first measure (EM1) suggests that earnings are smoother (relative to cash flows) in a weak investor protection country, such as South Korea, than in a high investor protection country, such as the US. Similarly, firms in low investor protection countries, such as India or Greece, exhibit a greater negative correlation between changes in accruals and cash flows (EM2) than do firms in the US. The first discretion measure (EM3) shows that the relative magnitude of accruals to the magnitude of operating cash flows is small in countries like the UK or the US compared to countries like Austria, Belgium or Germany. The second discretion measure reveals that all countries exhibit some degree of loss avoidance, as EM4 is always greater than one. The crosscountry variation in this measure is consistent with the pattern depicted by the other measures.
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The measures EM1-EM4 are highly correlated and the rankings corresponding to the four individual and the aggregate earnings management measures are very similar. Factor analysis suggests that there is only one factor in the four earnings management measures. Thus, it seems appropriate to combine all four variables into a summary measure for earnings management as described in the previous section. 16 The last column of Panel A presents a country ranking based on this aggregate earnings management measure, showing high ranks for countries such as Austria, Germany and Italy, and low ranks for countries like Australia, the UK and the US.
The simple correlations among institutional variables and the aggregate earnings management measure for each country are presented in Panel B of Table 2 . Consistent with our main hypothesis, there is a strong negative correlation between the aggregate earnings management measure and both the outside investor rights and enforcement proxies. However, there are also significant correlations between the earnings management measure and other institutional factors, suggesting that earnings management is greater in countries where stock market play a lesser role, ownership is more concentrated and disclosure levels are low. The following empirical analysis attempts to control for these correlations.
Empirical results

Descriptive cluster analysis
We begin with a cluster analysis that provides descriptive evidence on systematic patterns traditions. Thus, the cluster approach suggests that the common and code law distinction only 18 While cluster 2 seems generally between cluster 1 and 3, a comparison of the Euclidean distances between the cluster centers supports our interpretation that cluster 2 and 3 are closer to each other than cluster 1 and 2. 19 The fact that the three East Asian countries in this group have by far the worst earnings management ratings is consistent with Ball et al. (1999) . They argue that, despite the common-law influence, reported earnings do not exhibit common-law properties with respect to (asymmetric) timeliness. See also Fan and Wong (1999) for similar findings.
matters when legal enforcement is reasonably high, as in the first and second cluster. In the third cluster, where the quality of legal enforcement is low, legal tradition does not seem to be a determinant of cluster membership.
Panel C of Table 3 shows that the differences between the cluster means of the aggregate earnings management measure are statistically significant. Outsider economies (cluster 1) exhibit lower levels of earnings management than insider economies (clusters 2 and 3). Thus, even after controlling for interactions among various institutional factors, earnings management continues to be lower in economies with strong investor protection, large stock markets and dispersed ownership. Highlighting the salient importance of legal enforcement, the third cluster exhibits significantly higher earnings management than the second cluster.
The role of investor protection: Multiple regression analysis
The previous analyses suggest that earnings management is systematically related to countries' institutional characteristics. A key issue, however, is which institutional factors are primary determinants of earnings management and which of them are correlated outcomes. We posit that better investor protection results in less earnings management because insider enjoy fewer private control benefits and hence have lower incentives to hide firm performance from outside investors. This hypothesis ties in closely with the findings in Nenova (2000) Our multiple regressions therefore examine the relation between earnings management and investor protection. Column 1 of Table 3 reports a rank regression using the aggregate earnings management measure as the dependent variable. 21 Results show that outside investor protection explains a substantial portion (39%) of the variation in the earnings management measure. Outsider rights and legal enforcement both exhibit a significant negative association with earnings management.
The multiple regressions, however, assume that outside investor rights and legal enforcement are exogenous variables. If, on the other hand, outsider protection and earnings management are simultaneously determined, our results suffer from an endogeneity bias. We address this concern by using countries' legal origins and wealth as instruments for the investor protection variables as suggested by Levine (1999). While related to the level of investor protection (see La Porta et al., 1998), a country's legal origin can be considered as predetermined and exogenous to our analysis because the origins of most legal systems are several centuries old and many countries obtained their legal system through occupation and colonization. We use three dummy variables, indicating English, French, German and Scandinavian legal origins, as instrumental variables. In addition, we use a country's average per-capita GDP, measured prior to our sample period from 1980 to 1989, as an instrument because it is costly to create and maintain an effective legal infrastructure and hence a country's wealth potentially influences the level of legal enforcement.
Column 2 of Table 4 reports results from a two-stage least squares regressions. 22 The relation between outside investor protection and earnings management does not appear to be affected by the endogeneity of investor protection. The findings support our primary hypothesis that the pervasiveness of earnings management decreases in the level of investor protection.
Finally, we attempt to provide some more direct evidence that insiders' private control benefits and earnings management activities are in fact positively associated as implied by our main hypothesis. The problem in documenting this relation is that large private control benefits and extensive earnings management are hypothesized to be joint outcomes of poor investor protection. For this reason, we adopted a "reduced-form" approach for the primary analysis by using the investor protection variables.
An alternative approach is to estimate the relation between earnings management and private control benefits, accounting for the results in Nenova (2000) and Dyck and Zingales (2002) that investor protection partly determines the level of private control benefits. We use the mean block premium estimated by Dyck and Zingales (2002) as a proxy for the level of private control benefits, which has been shown to be negatively associated with both outsider rights and legal enforcement. Accounting for these associations, we estimate a two-stage least squares regression of the aggregate earnings management measure on the control benefits proxy using the level of outsider rights and legal enforcement as instruments. The results presented in column 3 of Table 5 show that earnings management and private control benefits exhibit a significantly positive association.
Robustness Checks
Prior work shows that per-capita GDP explains differences in observed financing, ownership, and payout policies across countries. Consequently, we re-estimate our primary regressions using contemporaneous per-capita GDP as an additional explanatory variable (not reported). While GDP is marginally significant in this regression (p = 0.182), the significantly negative relation between the investor protection variables and earnings management is robust to the inclusion of this proxy.
Another potential concern is that our results are driven by economic heterogeneity across countries. While earnings management measures are computed relative to the operating cash flow to control for differences in firms' economic processes, differences in industry composition across countries can potentially affect our results. Since Table 1 shows that the fraction of manufacturing firms varies considerably across countries, the regressions are re-estimated using a sub-sample comprised exclusively of manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) . The regression results for this sub-sample (not reported) are essentially the same as those presented in Table 4 , alleviating concerns that cross-country differences in industry composition drive our main findings.
23
Finally, we are concerned that differences in firm characteristics and macroeconomic stability affect our inferences. For instance, larger firms have smoother earnings, and operating leverage is positively related to earnings volatility. Similarly, inflation rates and the volatility in growth rates influence the variability of accounting earnings. Consequently, we re-estimate the regressions using additional controls for median firm size, median capital intensity, a country's average yearly inflation rate and the standard deviation of the real GDP growth rate. 24 The results (not reported) are consistent with our original findings in Table 4 . In particular, outside investor rights and legal enforcement continue to have a significantly negative relation with earnings management.
The role of other institutional factors
While the robustness checks in the previous section alleviate concerns that our findings are driven by economic heterogeneity across countries, we still have to address the concern that other institutional variables, which are correlated with investor protection, are responsible for our main findings. Section 2 discusses several competing effects, which are addressed as follows.
First, well-enforced accounting rules can limit managers' ability to distort reported earnings as well as shape the properties of reported earnings. While we take the view that accounting rules reflect a country's legal and institutional framework and are therefore endogenous to our analysis, it is an empirical matter whether our results are robust to the inclusion of controls for countries' stated accounting rules. 25 To address this issue, we reestimate the main regression and include an "accrual index" constructed by Hung (2001) as a control variable. This index captures the use of accrual accounting rules to accelerate the recognition of economic transactions (e.g., R&D activities, pension plans). It proxies for the 24 OLS regressions without ranking the right-hand side variables produce similar results. 25 A related concern is that the use of earnings for tax and financial accounting purposes may introduce earnings management and in particular smoothing incentives unrelated to investor protection. We therefore re-run the main regression including a proxy for the degree of a country's tax-book conformity (e.g., Alford et al., 1993; Hung, extent to which a country's stated accounting rules are intended to produce timely and informative reported earnings.
The results presented in column 1 of Table 5 show that the accounting rules proxy is significant in conjunction with the outsider rights and legal enforcement variables. However, as shown in column 2, the coefficient on the accounting rules proxy becomes insignificant in the 2SLS regression specification, whereas the investor protection variables remain significant.
These results support our view that the accounting rules are endogenous and confirm the key importance of the investor protection variables as determinant of earnings management.
Finally, we examine the incremental impact of ownership concentration on insiders'
earnings management incentives since prior research highlights the relation between firms' ownership structures and the properties of reported earnings (e.g., Fan and Wong, 1999; Ball et al., 1999) . We re-estimate the main regression using a proxy for ownership concentration constructed by La Porta et al. (1998) as an additional control variable. Neither the rank regression nor the 2SLS regression presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 indicate any incremental explanatory power of the ownership variable. Thus, while differences in ownership concentration may be related to cross-sectional variation in earnings management within a country, our country-level tests suggest that average ownership patterns are not a primary determinant of systematic earnings management activities across countries.
In summary, while our results do not preclude a complementary role for other institutional variables, they are consistent with the hypothesis that outside investor protection is a key determinant of earnings management activities around the world.
2001). In this regression (not reported), the tax variable is not significant while the results for the investor protection variables are similar to those reported in Table 4 .
Conclusion and Caveats
This paper examines how the legal protection of outside investors affects insiders' incentives to manage reported earnings. The analysis is based on the notion that insiders, i.e., managers and controlling shareholders, have an incentive to acquire private control benefits.
Insiders' ability to divert resources for their benefit is limited by a legal system that protects the rights of outside investors. However, outsiders can only take legal and other disciplinary actions against insiders if they detect the private benefits. Consequently, insiders manipulate accounting reports to conceal their diversion activities.
Using this framework, we hypothesize that earnings management decreases in legal protection because, when investor protection is strong, insiders enjoy fewer private control benefits and consequently have little incentive to conceal firm performance. This hypothesis is tested using financial accounting data from 31 countries. We perform a descriptive cluster analysis to identify groupings of countries with similar institutional characteristics and then show that earnings management varies systematically across these institutional clusters. The cluster analysis suggests that countries sharing arm's length institutional features, typically AngloAmerican countries, exhibit lower levels of earnings management than countries with insider institutional characteristics, largely Continental-European and East-Asian countries.
Prior work shows that investor protection is a key primitive driving corporate choices, such as firms' financing and dividend policies as well as ownership structures (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997 Porta et al. , 1998 Porta et al. and 1999 . We complement these findings by analyzing the impact of investor protection on firms' financial reporting and earnings management practices. The regression results show that earnings management is negatively associated with the quality of minority shareholder rights and legal enforcement. These findings are robust to controls for country wealth, economic heterogeneity across countries as well as the inclusion of other institutional factors capturing international differences in the accounting rules and ownership concentration.
Our empirical findings point to an important link between legal institutions and the quality of accounting earnings reported to market participants. They complement earlier work in finance, which generally treats the quality of corporate reporting as exogenous, and prior research in accounting, which documents systematic patterns in the relation between stock returns and accounting numbers.
The empirical results, however, are subject to several caveats. First, earnings management is notoriously difficult to measure, especially as it manifests itself in different forms. We attempt to address these difficulties by computing several proxies for earnings management and obtain consistent results across all measures. However, our findings rely on the ability of these measures to capture relative differences in earnings management activities around the world. Second, the existence of complementarities among institutional factors raises concerns about endogeneity bias. We attempt to address these issues with two-stage least squares estimation. But as theoretical relations among the institutional factors are not yet well understood, it is possible that we have not appropriately controlled for the endogenous interactions among the factors. Finally, the analysis assumes that a country's institutional infrastructure is fairly stable from 1990 to 1999. While institutional changes are slow and complex, this assumption need not be valid. However, recent changes in the institutional frameworks of Continental European countries towards an Anglo-American system are likely to bias results against our hypotheses. The full sample consists of 70,955 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 1990-99 across 31 countries and 8,616 nonfinancial firms. Financial accounting information is obtained from the November 2000 version of the Worldscope database. To be included in our sample, countries must have at least 300 firm-year observations for a number of accounting variables, including total assets, sales, net income, and operating income. For each firm, we require income statement and balance sheet information for at least 3 consecutive years. We discard three countries (Chile, New Zealand, Turkey) because of an insufficient number of observations to compute the loss avoidance measure and three countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) due to hyperinflation. Firm size is measured as total US$ sales (in thousands). Capital intensity is measured as the ratio of long-term assets over total assets. The fraction of manufacturing firms is the percentage of firm-year observations with SIC 2000 to 3999.
Average per-capita GDP in constant 1995 US$ is computed from 1990 to 1999. Inflation is measured as the average percentage change in consumer prices from 1990 to 1998. Volatility of GDP growth is measured as the standard deviation of the growth rate in real per-capita GDP from 1990 to 1998. The classification of the legal origin and the legal tradition are based on La Porta et al. (1998) . CD (CM) indicates a code-law (common-law) country. The outside investor rights variable is the "anti-director rights" index created by La Porta et al. (1998) . It is an aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights and ranges from zero to five. Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998) : (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range from zero to 10. The "importance of the equity markets" is measured by the mean rank across three variables used in La Porta et al. (1997) : (1) the ratio of the aggregate stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross national product, (2) the number of listed domestic firms relative to the population, and (3) the number of IPOs relative to the population. Each variable is ranked such that higher scores indicate a greater importance of the stock market. Ownership concentration is measured as the median percentage of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the 10 largest privately owned nonfinancial firms (La Porta et al., 1998) . The disclosure index measures the inclusion or omission of 90 items in the 1990 annual reports (La Porta et al. 1998 (November 2000) . EM1 is the country's median ratio of the firm-level standard deviations of operating income and operating cash flow (both scaled by lagged total assets). The cash flow from operations is equal to operating income minus accruals, where accruals are calculated as: (∆total current assets -∆cash) -(∆total current liabilities-∆short-term debt -∆taxes payable) -depreciation expense. EM2 is the country's Spearman correlation of the change in accruals and the change in cash flow from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets). EM3 is the country's median ratio of the absolute value of accruals and the absolute value of the cash flow from operations. EM4 is the number of "small profits" divided by the number of "small losses" for each country. A firm-year observation is classified as a "small profit" if net earnings (scaled by lagged total assets) are in the range [0,0.01]. A firm-year observation is classified as a "small loss" if net earnings (scaled by lagged total assets) are in the range [-0.01,0) . Net earnings are bottom-line reported income after interest, taxes, special items, extraordinary items, reserves and any other items. The "aggregate earnings management measure" is the average rank across all four measures, EM1-4. The sign in the column heading indicates whether higher scores for the respective EM measure imply more earnings management (+) or less earnings management (-). 
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Panel B: Correlation between Earnings Management and Various Institutional Factors
The table presents Spearman correlations and significance levels (in parentheses) between the following measures. The "aggregate earnings management measure" is the average rank of all four earnings management measures, EM1-EM4. Outside investor rights is the "anti-director rights" index from La Porta et al. (1998) . It is an aggregate measure of (minority) shareholder rights and ranges from zero to six. Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998) : (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range from zero to 10. The "importance of the equity markets" is measured by the mean rank across three variables used in La Porta et al. (1997) : (1) the ratio of the aggregate stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross national product, (2) the number of listed domestic firms relative to the population, and (3) the number of IPOs relative to the population. Each variable is ranked such that higher scores indicate a greater importance of the stock market. Ownership concentration is measured as the median percentage of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the 10 largest privately owned nonfinancial firms (La Porta et al., 1998 (see table 2 ). Outside investor rights is the "anti-director rights" index from La Porta et al. (1998) . It is an aggregate measure of (minority) shareholder rights and ranges from zero to five. Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998) : (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range from zero to 10. The first column presents a simple rank regression. The regression is estimated using two-stage least squares. Instrumental variables are the rank of the country's real per-capita GDP averaged from 1980 to 1989 and three binary variables indicating an English, German, French, or Scandinavian legal origin based on the classification in La Porta et al. (1998) . Private control benefits are measured at the country level as the mean block premium estimated by Dyck and Zingales (2002) . It is based on transfers of controlling blocks of shares. The third regression is also estimated using two-stage least squares. The instrumental variables are the outsider rights index and the legal enforcement. Table 5 Earnings Management and Outside Investor Protection:
Controlling for Difference in the Accounting Rules and Ownership Concentration
The table presents coefficients and two-sided p-values (in parentheses) from rank regressions of the aggregate earnings management measure on outside investor rights and enforcement controlling for other institutional factors. Outside investor rights is the "anti-director rights" index from La Porta et al. (1998) , which ranges from zero to five. Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998) : (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range from zero to 10. The accrual index variable captures the use of accruals to accelerate the recognition of economic transactions (e.g., R&D activities, pension obligations) in accounting. It is constructed by Hung (2001) . Ownership concentration is measured as the median percentage of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the 10 largest privately owned nonfinancial firms (La Porta et al., 1998) . The regressions in columns 2 and 4 are estimated using two-stage least squares. Instrumental variables are the rank of the country's real per-capita GDP averaged from 1980 to 1989 and three binary variables indicating an English, German, French, or Scandinavian legal origin based on the classification in La Porta et al. (1998 
